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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY
Connexity-Identity and Proof of Prior Conviction
The fact that a person has been previously convicted may be relevant
and admissible for several distinct purposes-for example, to provide the
basis for sentencing the defendant under the general statute relative to
habitual offenders;' to prove that the defendant should be found guilty of
driving while intoxicated, second offense;2 to impeach a witness by prior
convictions;3 and perhaps, as in the Federal Rules of Evidence,' to prove a
fact underlying the conviction. 5
Assuming that in a particular case a prior conviction of a person is
relevant and admissible, how is the identity of the person involved in the
instant proceeding and that of the person previously convicted to be
proved? Is the coincidence of name alone sufficient for admissibility or
must this circumstance be "connected up" with other evidence? The
problem is fraught with difficulty. 6
In State v. Curtis7 the supreme court held in an habitual offender
proceeding that coincidence of name is not alone sufficient to make a
prima facie showing of identity. In 1976, one year later, when the Curtis
case was again before the court, 8 the court made clear that in addition to
the method provided statutorily for such cases, 9 other methods may be
utilized:
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Member, St. Mary Parish Bar.
1. LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (Supp. 1956).
2. Id. 14:98 (Supp. 1975). See State v. Neal, 347 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977); State
v. Benoit, 311 So. 2d 857 (La. 1975).
3. LA. R.S. 15:495 (Supp. 1952).
4. FED. R. EVID. 803(22).
5. Whether or not such an exception to the hearsay rule is generally available
in Louisiana is not clear. See in this connection the text at notes 193-200, infra.
6. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2529 (1940).
7. 319 So. 2d 434 (La. 1975).
8. State v. Curtis, 338 So. 2d 662 (La. 1976).
9. LA. R.S. 15:529.1(F) (Supp. 1956) provides: "The certificate of the warden
or other chief officer of any state prison, or of the superintendent or other chief
officer of any penitentiary of this state or any other state of the United States, or of
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Various methods of proof to establish identity have been recog-
nized. We do not consider that identity of name of defendant and the
person previously convicted is sufficient evidence of identity. Iden-
tification of the accused may be by testimony of witnesses, by expert
opinion as to the fingerprints of the accused when compared with
those in the prison record introduced, or by photographs contained in
the duly authenticated record.' 0
Relying in part on the second Curtis case, the court in City of Monroe
v. French" held in a driving while intoxicated, second offense, case that
unless the state is prepared to adduce evidence further linking the defend-
ant to the person with the same name in the prior proceeding, the prior
conviction is inadmissible. The court in French went on to say that proof
of identity must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 12
Providing the requisite proof may be difficult. The state's task is
simplified somewhat by the court's holding in an abbreviated opinion in
State v. Pike'3 that despite the broad ambit of the attorney-client privilege
in criminal cases,' 4 defense counsel in the prior case may be required to
testify that defendant in the instant proceeding is the same as the person he
represented in the prior proceeding. The court said, however, that
[t]his ruling is not to be construed as suggesting that the state
may elicit from the attorney witness over further objection any further
information, particularly as relates to the outcome of the previous
trial.
any foreign country, under the seal of his office, if he has a seal, containing the
name of the person imprisoned, the photograph, and the finger prints of the person
as they appear in the records of his office, a statement of the court in which a
conviction was had, the date and time of sentence, length of time imprisoned, and
date of discharge from prison or penitentiary, shall be prima facie evidence on the
trial of any person for a second and subsequent offense of the imprisonment and of
the discharge of the person, either by a pardon or expiration of his sentence as the
case may be under the conviction stated and set forth in the certificate."
10. State v. Curtis, 338 So. 2d 662, 664 (La. 1976).
11. 345 So. 2d 23 (La. 1977).
12. Compare the second Curtis case wherein the court said that in a general
habitual offender proceeding, the showing of identity is to be to the "satisfaction of
the trial judge." 338 So. 2d at 664.
13. 343 So. 2d 1388 (La. 1977). Apparently the case was decided on the state's
application for writs without benefit of oral argument or full briefing. See the
minority views expressed by Justices Dixon and Dennis.
14. See State v. Hayes, 324 So. 2d 421 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575,
593 (1977).
15. State v. Pike, 343 So. 2d 1388 (La. 1977).
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Whether the rules announced in the foregoing cases will likewise be
applied in other instances in which proof of prior convictions may be
relevant and admissible will be interesting to observe.
Other Crimes-Balancing Risk of Prejudice Against Probative Value
Even though evidence of another crime is relevant and fits within an
exception to the other crimes exclusionary rule recognized by Revised
Statutes title 15, sections 445-46,16 its risk of undue prejudice must be
balanced against its probative value, according to State v. Ledet.17 The
writers fully agree. Such a view accords with the analysis earlier provided
in State v. Moore. 18 In the Ledet case, the other crime was of an even
more egregious character than the charged crime and considering this
circumstance the court stated that "the evidence [was] too prejudicial for
admission even had it been extremely relevant." 19
Other Crimes-Knowledge and Intent
Where the defendant is charged with illegal distribution of drugs and
there is no real question as to the identity of the defendant as the person
who made the alleged distribution, may the prosecution in its case in chief
introduce evidence of other alleged instances of distribution of the same
drug for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge or intent? In the
significant decision of State v. Clark2" the court, via an opinion authored
16. LA. R.S. 15:445 (1950):
Inference of Intent; evidence of acts similar to that charged
In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent
of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question
of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circum-
stances of the transaction.
Id. 15:446:
Evidence where knowledge or intent is material and where offense is one of
a system
When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony
may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to
establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system,
evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commis-
sion of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and
intent, but not to prove the offense charged.
17. 345 So. 2d 474 (La. 1977).
18. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
19. 345 So. 2d at 479 n.2.
20. 338 So. 2d 690 (La. 1976).
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by Justice Dixon, 2 holds in the negative, emphasizing that the crime
involved is one requiring general intent only.22 Relying on State v.
Moore23 and State v. Banks,24 the court made clear that "the prosecution
can not introduce an extraneous offense under the guise of proving 'guilty
knowledge' when in fact it is not a genuine matter in issue. -2' The writers
agree.
The holding of the court in the Clark case seems at variance with the
theory adopted in the earlier case of State v. Strange .26 The Strange case
concerned the admissibility of evidence that at the time a defendant
possessed amphetamines he also possessed marijuana to show knowledge
or intent as reflecting scienter. A divided court in Strange, without
extensive discussion, held the evidence admissible. Justice Tate
concurred, expressing the view that "[t]he marijuana may have been
admissible as part of the res gestae, but not to show scienter." 27 Justice
Calogero dissented, apparently concluding that the evidence was inad-
missible under any theory.
If the defendant in Strange, by cross-examination of the state's
witnesses or in his own case in chief, had claimed that he had not
knowingly possessed the amphetamines, an argument can be made that the
state could very properly have shown the marijuana possession on rebuttal
to negative the purported innocent possession. Absent a claim on the part
of the defendant that the possession was innocent, the rationale of the
Moore and Clark decisions would seem to indicate that the state may not
in its case in chief introduce the other crimes evidence on the supposition
that defendant will thereafter claim that possession was unknown or
unintended.
Other Crimes-System and Modus Operandi
Despite the narrow definition given to "system" in section 446,28 the
21. Justices Tate and Calogero signed the plurality opinion written by Justice
Dixon. Justice Dennis concurred, "being of the view that the State may use the
evidence of the prior offense in rebuttal in a proper case where the defendant has
raised issues of intent or identity, which were not present here." 338 So. 2d at 693.
Chief Justice Sanders and Justices Summers and Marcus dissented.
22. For cases following Clark, see State v. Frederick, 340 So. 2d 1353 (La.
1976); State v. Slayton, 338 So. 2d 694 (La. 1976).
23. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
24. 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975).
25. 338 So. 2d at 693.
26. 334 So. 2d 182 (La. 1976).
27. Id, at 186.
28. See note 16, supra, for the text of LA. R.S. 15:446 (1950).
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courts have interpreted it to include crimes of like modus operandi.29
When is another crime so closely associated with the charged crime as to
constitute part of a "system" within the meaning of the knowledge,
intent, system exception to the other crimes exclusionary rule? State v.
Waddles3" holds that for the other crime to fit within the "system"
exception, the circumstances of the other crime "must be so similar and
individual as preponderantly to demonstrate that the perpetrator of both
must be identical." 3 1 This test, said a majority of the court, was not met in
Waddles .32
Character of the Defendant-"' Neighborhood" Reputation
Traditionally reputation testimony relevant to the likelihood of the
defendant's having committed the charged crime was limited to the reputa-
tion the defendant bore in the "neighborhood" in which he resided.33
Reflecting this tradition, article 479 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Proce-
dure (now section 479 of Revised Statutes title 15) provided that
"[c]haracter, whether good or bad, depends upon the general reputation
that a man has among his neighbors, not upon what particular persons
think of him.''
34
Who are defendant's neighbors for this purpose? For example, can a
defendant's longtime fellow employees justifiably be called his "neigh-
bors" in this context when although they know him well at work and the
reputation he bears there, they do not reside in his community or residen-
tial neighborhood and do not know his community-wide reputation? In
State v. Walker 35 the court took cognizance of the fact that living patterns
have altered and that modern authorities, including Professors Wigmore
and McCormick, 36 have hence urged that persons familiar with a defend-
29. See State v. Lee, 340 So. 2d 1339, 1344-45 (La. 1976) (Dixon, J., dissent-
ing); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973); State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243
So. 2d 793 (1971).
30. 336 So. 2d 810 (La. 1976).
31. Id. at 815.
32. A 4-3 majority held that the "other crime" qualified under the "system"
exception in State v. Lee, 340 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1976), and by a 4-3 vote the court
held that the "other crime" did not so qualify in State v. Gaines, 340 So. 2d 1294
(La. 1976).
33. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 191, at 456 (1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE § 1615, at 590 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
34. LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950).
35. 334 So. 2d 205 (La. 1976).
36. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 191, at 456 (1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 1616, at 591 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
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ant's reputation at work be permitted to testify. Achieving the result
advocated by these authors, the court in Walker, in a very well-reasoned
opinion authored by Justice Dixon, wisely holds that "neighbors" in
section 479 should be interpreted to include long-standing coworkers. As
pertinently quoted in Walker, Dean Wigmore stated:
Time has produced new conditions for reputations. The tradi-
tional requirement about "neighborhood" reputation was appropriate
to the conditions of the time; but it should not be taken as imposing
arbitrary limitations not appropriate in other times. Alia tempora, alii
mores. 37
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
Very Young Child as Witness
The test of a witness's competency, by statute in Louisiana,3" is
understanding, not age. The law stipulates, however, that before a child
younger than twelve is to be sworn as a witness over objection, the court
must be satisfied, after examination, that the child has the requisite
understanding.39 State v. Noble,40 which concerned the alleged rape of a
four-year-old child, affords a good example of the application of the rule
and the procedure to be followed by the trial court. It held that wide
discretion is to be vested in the trial court and that no error was to be found
in the trial judge's permitting the alleged victim of the rape, who was five
years old at the time of the trial, to testify with respect to the occurrence.
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Limiting Examination of Witness to Single Attorney
Article 17 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure states that a
trial court "has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be
37. 334 So. 2d at 207.
38. LA. R.S. 15:469 (1950) provides:
Understanding, and not age, must determine whether any person tendered as a
witness shall be sworn; but no child less then twelve years of age shall, over the
objection either of the district attorney or of the defendant, be sworn as a
witness, until the court is satisfied, after examination, that such child has
sufficient understanding to be a witness.
39. For further discussion of the problem see 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 505-
09 (1940); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-
Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 448 (1974), reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA
EVIDENCE LAW 23 (Supp. 1976).
40. 342 So. 2d 170 (La. 1977).
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conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so
control the proceedings that justice is done." Does this broad authority
support a trial judge's ruling that only one lawyer should cross-examine a
witness and object to questions put to him by the other side? Rejecting
defense counsel's argument that such a ruling was a denial of the effective
assistance of counsel, the supreme court in State v. Unzueta41 upheld such
a ruling by the trial court. In doing so, the court expressed warm support
for such a rule. Although perhaps a sound ground rule generally, it seems
to these writers that no such rule should be rigidly applied by a trial court,
that in an appropriate setting the same should give way to the overriding
goal of full and orderly ascertainment and elucidation of facts and law .42
Testing Eyewitness Identification
Eyewitness identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a
crime is, from the standpoint of the defendant, absolutely devastating
evidence-possibly the most difficult to meet and refute.43 Sometimes, of
course, the eyewitness may be mistaken. The initial identification may
have been a product of suggestion,' and the difficulty in "shaking" an
initial identification is compounded when it has been reinforced by subse-
quent events. The fact that at the trial defendant is normally seated next to
defense counsel makes the eyewitness's in-court identification especially
questionable. 45 How may defense counsel anticipating a questionable
identification protect his client? Where no lineup has been held, does the
defendant have the right to a pre-trial lineup? Even if the defendant has no
"right" to same, may the trial court in its discretion, on the request of the
41. 337 So. 2d 1102 (La. 1976).
42. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 783 (1940).
43. For discussions of the problem, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 312 (1973), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 382; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 390 (1971), reprinted in G.
PUGH, supra note 39, at 383; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REV. 321, 333 (1970), reprinted in G. PUGH,
supra note 39, at 385; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 35 LA. L. REV. 461, 480 (1975), reprinted in G.
PUGH, supra note 39, at 176 (Supp. 1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Criminal Procedure 1, 34 LA. L. REV. 396, 414
(1974), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 179 (Supp. 1976).
44. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); and their progeny.
45. See discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-
1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 592 (1977).
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defendant, order such a lineup? If such a lineup is to be held, can the
defendant succeed in efforts to secure the presence of another suspect?
The problems are manifold.
In an erudite opinion authored by Justice Tate, the majority of the
court in State v. Boettcher46 (a murder case) held that although a defend-
ant has no constitutional or legal right to insist on a pre-trial lineup, "a
district court has broad discretion to order one or not, in the interests of the
fairness of the identification of the defendant, upon proper showing of an
exceptional nature that otherwise the trial testimony as to his visual
identification (if a material issue) may not be reliable." 4 7 The court went
on to say that the trial court also "has broad discretion to order protective
measures other than a pretrial lineup, such as by seating the defendant
elsewhere than in the normal place of an accused in the courtroom. 48 It
appears, however, from Boettcher that where the trial court has refused to
grant defendant's request for a pre-trial lineup, the supreme court will be
very reluctant to upset a conviction on appeal-that to protect his client's
interest in the event of a trial court denial of such a request, defense
counsel had best seek redress by pre-trial writ of review.
A companion case to Boettcher is State v. Jackson.49 The defendant
in Jackson sought to have another individual placed in a lineup with him,
maintaining that the police had received "hard information" that the other
had committed the crime. The supreme court, on application for writ of
review, remanded the case to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion
as to whether to grant the requested lineup. In a perceptive concurring
opinion by Justice Dennis, it was recognized that whether the other suspect
should be so included involves serious problems concerning the latter's
interest in not being forced to participate in such a lineup.
50
Rebuttal and Surrebuttal-'"Saving" Evidence
The impropriety of the state's "saving" part of its case for introduc-
46. 338 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1976).
47. Id. at 1361.
48. Id. See State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485 (La. 1977); State v. Johnson, 343
So. 2d 155 (La. 1977); State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370 (La. 1976).
49. 338 So. 2d 1363 (La. 1976).
50. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1%9); United States v. Holland, 552
F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1977). Relevant to such an inquiry is State v. Bell, 334 So. 2d 385
(La. 1976), concerning the interest of a person on bail not to be forced to participate
in a lineup.
[Vol. 38
WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
tion on rebuttal is now clearly established in Louisiana. 5 State v. Turner5 2
is clear and persuasive authority on the point. It affords an excellent
discussion of all aspects of the problem and demonstrates why, in tandem
with another matter,53 the practice provided the basis for reversal. In broad
language the court stated:
The state may not reserve part of its case-in-chief for rebuttal
testimony, after the defense has put on its case and when it can no
longer present evidence to rebut the state's case. This is contrary to
statute, to ancient jurisprudence, and to rules of fair play. 54
The court recognized, however, that as stated in Marr's Criminal Jurispru-
dence,
this rule cannot always be enforced with cast-iron inflexibility, and
must yield in its application to the sound discretion of the trial judge,
whose ruling will not be disturbed except in extreme cases, as where
the evidence has been kept back deliberately and for the purpose of
deceiving and obtaining an undue advantage of defendant.
55
Credibility Attack and the Right of Confrontation
State v. Bolton56 makes clear that a defendant in a criminal case has a
constitutional right to cross-examine about pertinent prior inconsistent
statements made by witnesses for the prosecution. In a very well-written
opinion 57 Justice Calogero, citing Davis v. Alaska,58 stated:
51. For a discussion of prior cases bearing on the subject, see The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651,
661 (1976).
52. 337 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976).
53. Another basis for reversal concerned the failure of the state to give notice
to the defendant of an incriminating statement which was introduced by the state in
rebuttal, in contravention, the court found, of the anti-"saving" rule. For a discus-
sion of this aspect of the case, see text at notes 123-25, infra.
54. 337 So. 2d at 458 (citations omitted).
55. 2 MARR'S CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LOUISIANA § 633, at 967 (1923)
(footnotes omitted), quoted in State v. Turner, 337 So. 2d 455, 459 (La. 1976). The
court, quoting the above language, found in the later case of State v. Watkins, 340
So. 2d 235, 239 (La. 1976), that under the circumstances there presented, the
evidence offered in rebuttal was "timely rather than belatedly presented."
56. 337 So. 2d 446 (La. 1976).
57. This part of Justice Calogero's opinion achieved majority support. Finding
it unnecessary to take a position on other matters discussed in the plurality opinion,
Justice Dennis concurred in this part of the opinion only. Chief Justice Sanders and
Justices Summers and Marcus dissented.
58. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). For further discussion of the right of confrontation and
1978]
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Whatever the merit of the court's ruling that the report should
not be produced, it can hardly be denied that it was error to gag
counsel in cross-examination by preventing an effort to impeach the
witness by using information which he had fortuitously acquired prior
to trial.
The simple fact is that defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation by appropriate cross-examination was improperly cur-
tailed in a material and substantial way. 59
A1TACKING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Prior Inconsistent Statement-Attempt to Minimize Impact
Where defense counsel in a criminal case knows of a damaging prior
inconsistent statement by one of his witnesses, may he forestall prosecu-
torial inquiry into same by questioning the witness on direct with respect
thereto, eliciting the fact of the prior statement and that it was "entirely
different" from his testimony on the stand? The court in State v. Red-
wine60 properly found such a defense maneuver inefficacious, holding that
despite such a defense tactic the prosecution is entitled on cross-examina-
tion to make the usual specific inquiry of the witness regarding time, place
and circumstances of the out-of-court inconsistent statement. 61 Further, if
in response to such a question the witness denies the statement, the same is
admissible to impeach.
Bias, Interest, Corruption-Ambit of Attack
In State v. Cappo62 the state's star witness testified that the defendant
had conspired with him to burglarize a residence, and admitted that he (the
witness) was testifying on behalf of the state in accordance with a "deal."
The defense claimed that the witness's implication of the defendant, an
innocent party, was part of a cleverly designed scheme to minimize the
witness's sentence and that the same was in keeping with the witness's
defendant's right to attack the credibility of prosecution witnesses, see The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV.
575, 586 (1977); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 538 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
39, at 33 (Supp. 1976).
59. 337 So. 2d 446, 450 (La. 1976).
60. 337 So. 2d 1041 (La. 1976).
61. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950).
62. 345 So. 2d 443 (La. 1977).
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similar conduct upon other occasions. Reversing the conviction, the court
held that the trial court erred in not permitting the defendant to show such
prior similar conduct. The case demonstrates the wide berth the court
apparently feels should be accorded to a bias, interest, corruption attack
upon the credibility of a state's witness, 63 a right which is now recognized
to be of federal constitutional dimensions. 64
Bias, Interest, Corruption-Prior Arrest When Relevant to Show Bias
and Interest
In an excellent opinion in State v. Robinson,65 Justice Tate, speaking
for a unanimous court, makes it very clear that if a witness's prior arrest
has a particularized relevance to show motive for falsification because of
bias or interest, the same may be inquired into, despite the provisions of
section 495 of Revised Statutes title 15.66 The writers fully agree.
IMPEACHMENT
Bias, Interest, Corruption-Extrinsic Showing of "Collateral" Matter
Revised Statutes title 15, section 494, provides that "[i]t is not
competent to impeach a witness as to collateral facts or irrelevant mat-
ter. "67 Was it the intent of this provision to preclude an extrinsic showing
of a witness's bias, interest, or corruption by collateral matter? For
reasons advanced by these writers in a prior issue of this Review, 68 we feel
that it was not-that instead, it was designed as a general limitation upon
an extrinsic showing of a prior inconsistent statement. 69 Under the sug-
63. See State v. Nolan, 341 So. 2d 885 (La. 1977).
64. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 586
(1977). See also State v. Bolton, 337 So. 2d 446 (La. 1976) (relying in part on Davis
v. Alaska, reversed a conviction because of improper limitation on defendant's
right of cross-examination).
65. 337 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1976).
66. LA. R.S. 15:495 (Supp. 1952) provides in part, "Evidence of conviction of
crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution, is admissible for the purpose of
impeaching the credibility of the witness." See The Work of tlhe Louisiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 586 (1977); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA.
L. REV. 525, 538 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 33 (Supp. 1976);
Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Arrests in Louisiana Criminal Trials,
19 LA. L. REV. 684 (1959), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 53.
67. LA. R.S. 15:494 (1950).
68. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 586 (1977).
69. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950).
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gested view, extrinsic matter introduced to show the bias, interest, or
corruption of a witness may be admissible even though it involves side
issues.
The court in the recent case of State v. Cappo7° reached the same end
result as that advocated by the writers, but by a different route. It
concluded that showing the bias, interest, or corruption of a witness is not
a collateral matter even though it involves going into circumstances that
otherwise would be unrelated. Because of its importance to the case, what
would otherwise be a side issue becomes non-collateral, reasons the court.
The writers agree that the "collateral" label should not be used to bar
extrinsic matter appropriately relevant to show bias, interest, or corrup-
tion. However, since matters thus inquired into may be relevant only for
impeachment purposes and may involve an inquiry into side issues, it is
submitted that their character as collateral matter should not be considered
altered simply because they are deemed admissible. 71
Convictions-Details of the Crime
In two cases72 decided during the past term, the court continued to
apply the rule announced in State v. Jackson7 3 in 1975, that a witness on
cross-examination who has admitted having been convicted of a crime
may be asked about details thereof to show "the true nature of the
offense." This position is an unorthodox, extreme minority view. For the
reasons set forth earlier, 74 the writers feel that the approach taken in
Jackson is unfortunate. The matter is the subject of critical comment in a
student topic note shortly to appear in this Review.
CORROBORATION OF WITNESSES
Proof of Prior Identification by Witness
One usually may not corroborate a witness until the witness "has
been impeached or contradicted, or his character or credibility assailed." 75
70. 345 So. 2d 443 (La. 1977).
71. But see 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1003 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)
(cited and relied upon by the court).
72. State v. Jackson, 339 So. 2d 730 (La. 1976); State v. Williams, 339 So. 2d
728 (La. 1976).
73. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 662 (1976).
74. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 662 (1976).
75. LA. R.S. 15:485 (1950). Because of the inherent untrustworthiness of an
[Vol. 38
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Louisiana law also provides that generally if a witness's testimony has
been "assailed," prior consistent statements made at an unsuspicious time
are admissible to corroborate the witness.7 6 Presumably, assertive conduct
is in this context to be treated as a "statement."-
77
Is there a condition prerequisite to the state's showing that a witness
who on the stand identifies the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime
had previously made an out-of-court identification? State v. Ford78 al-
ludes to the problem in a footnote 79 and takes the position that unless the
credibility of the state's witness has been attacked, the corroborating out-
of-court identification is inadmissible .8 This seems clearly to be within
the spirit of the statutory rules.
Supporting Credibility Prior to Attack
Section 484 of Revised Statutes title 15 sets forth the general rule that
a witness's credibility cannot properly be supported before it is attacked."s
Section 485 notes, however, that "the testimony of an accomplice may be
corroborated even before it is attacked.''82 State v. Passman8 3 is an
interesting case concerning the rule.
Although Louisiana statutes do not enumerate lack of capacity as a
means of attacking the credibility of a witness, it is a method generally
recognized elsewhere in the country and was approved by the Louisiana
alleged accomplice turned state's witness, LA. R.S. 15:485 (1950) provides that an
accomplice's testimony may be corroborated even absent an attack.
76. LA. R.S. 15:496 (1950). LA. R.S. 15:497 (1950), however, provides:
Evidence of former consistent statements is inadmissible to sustain a witness
who has been impeached by proof of former inconsistent statements, unless his
testimony be charged to have been given under the influence of some improper
or interested motive, or to be a recent fabrication, in which case, in order to
repel such imputation, it is proper to show that the witness made a similar
statement at a time when the supposed motive did not exist and the effect of
such statement could not be foreseen. But when a witness has been impeached
by evidence of declarations inconsistent with his testimony, he can not be
corroborated by statements made subsequent to such declarations.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2); State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976).
78. 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976).
79. Id. at 822 n.2.
80. See also the authorities relied on by the court: State v. Watson, 159 La. 779,
106 So. 302 (1925); State v. Waggoner, 39 La. Ann. 919, 3 So. 119 (1887). On
whether such a prior identification is hearsay, see the discussion of State v. Ford in
the text at notes 98-107, infra.
81. LA. R.S. 15:484 (1950).
82. Id. 15:485 (1950).
83. 345 So. 2d 874 (La. 1977).
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Supreme Court in 1976 in State v. Luckett.14 In Passman the prosecution
called the 80-year-old victim of an armed robbery, and in an effort to
demonstrate that the witness's vision was good, was permitted on direct
examination, over objection, to attempt to show that he was a hunter and
had recently killed game. Rejecting the state's argument that it had a right
to support the visual acuity of such an elderly witness even before attack,
the supreme court, citing section 484, upheld defense counsel's contention
that the trial court's ruling was erroneous. It found, however, that defend-
ant had not shown prejudice and concluded that under the circumstances
presented, the trial court ruling was non-reversible error.
It would seem very-difficult for a defendant to show actual prejudice
because of a violation of section 484, for it is difficult to demonstrate what
impact the corroborating testimony may have had on the minds of the jury.
Rather than to say that the action of the trial court was non-reversible
error, it would have been preferable, the writers submit, for the court to
hold that the witness's advanced age naturally raised questions about his
visual acuity, and that in light of such circumstances it was not inappro-
priate for the trial court in its discretion to admit the supportive testimony.
The rule permitting impeachment of testimony by a showing of lack of
capacity is a non-statutory, judge-made rule and it seems appropriate for
the court to regulate it by judge-made exceptions rather than by application
of an ill-fitting statute. The visual acuity of an octogenarian is inherently
subject to question, as is the credibility of an accomplice called by the
state. The factors giving rise to the statutory exception concerning an
accomplice support a similar exception here.
PRIVILEGE
State Recognition of Privilege or "Testimonial Incompetency" as Denial
of a Defendant's Rights of Confrontation and Compulsory Process
It is clear from Davis v. Alaska 5 that under certain circumstances
recognition of a testimonial privilege which has the effect of blocking a
criminal defendant's adducing relevant evidence may be an unconstitu-
tional denial of a defendant's right of confrontation.8 6 An analogous
84. 327 So. 2d 365 (La. 1976), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 585 (1977).
85. 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525,538 (1975), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 33 (Supp. 1976).
86. See State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367, 372 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring). See
also State v. Carney, 334 So. 2d 415 (La. 1976). For further discussion, see Note, 73
MIcH. L. REV. 1465 (1974).
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problem is presented where, instead of being phrased in terms of privilege,
a statute declares certain evidence to be "incompetent." In light of
Washington v. Texas,87 a state's putting certain matters in a sanctuary
area or "incompetency" category may violate a defendant's right of
compulsory process.
State v. Durr88 is an intriguing case bearing on the problem. Follow-
ing defendant's conviction of second degree murder, defense counsel
adduced testimony tending to substantiate his claim that during the trial the
foreman of the jury had, out of the presence of the defendant and other
jurors, conducted a simulated reenactment of the crime and had reported
the results to his fellow jurors. Defendant contended that in so doing, the
foreman became a "witness" giving evidence to the jury in violation of
defendant's right of confrontation. To establish the alleged misconduct,
defense counsel, in addition to adducing the testimony of a non-juror,
sought to question the jury foreman. Relying on section 470 of Revised
Statutes title 15, which states that a juror is incompetent to testify to his
own misconduct,89 the court, in a 4-3 decision, upheld the action of the
trial court in refusing to permit this line of questioning of the juror. 90
Justice Tate in dissent took the position that Code of Criminal Procedure
article 762(2) and the official comment thereto recognize the defendant's
right to be present at any simulated enactment of the alleged crime, and
that violation of this right would be a violation of his constitutional right to
confrontation. Justice Tate concluded that the juror incompetency provi-
sion should not be used to prevent defendant's showing a violation of such
valued constitutional rights. Further, it is submitted that to permit section
470 to bar defendant from establishing a denial of confrontation may well
have violated his right of compulsory process.
Reporter's Privilege
Dumez v. Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board9' is
the first appellate case in Louisiana concerning the conditional reporter's
privilege created in 1964 by the Louisiana Legislature. 92 The court said
87. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH.
L. REV. 71 (1974); Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1975).
88. 343 So. 2d 1004 (La. 1977).
89. LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950).
90. For other cases decided during the past term concerning the juror incompe-
tency rule, see State v. Sullivan, 333 So. 2d 638 (La. 1976); State v. Johanson, 332
So. 2d 270 (La. 1976).
91. 341 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
92. LA. R.S. 45:1451-1454 (Supp. 1964).
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that unlike statutes in some other states, the Louisiana conditional
privilege extends only to identity of informant and source of information,
not to the information itself. Here the court found that the reporter had
revealed the substance of the information. Finding that the party seeking to
compel disclosure of the source of information had not carried the statu-
tory burden of showing that the same was "essential to the protection of
the public interest," 93 the court upheld the privilege.
Police Records Privilege
Louisiana's Public Records Act94 provides that it shall not be inter-
preted to authorize access to
[r]ecords pertaining to pending criminal litigation or any criminal
litigation which can be reasonably anticipated, until such litigation
has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled.9"
The statute goes on to provide that "[w]henever the same is necessary"
judicial determinations of access shall be made after a "contradictory
hearing.' '96
Conella v. Johnson97 is an interesting case concerning whether under
particular circumstances a civil litigant has a right to examine public
officials concerning facts surrounding pertinent criminal proceedings, and
force production of documents relative to same. The supreme court,
speaking through Justice Marcus, held that in the hearing to determine
applicant's right to such information, applicants were entitled to question
public officials in order to show that the information sought was unrelated
to pending or reasonably anticipated litigation. Further, the court held that
testimony by the district attorney and assistant district attorney that newly
filed charges had reactivated investigation incidental to an earlier nolle
prossed charge was insufficient to cut off the right to the contradictory
hearing provided by the statute. The case appears eminently sound.
HEARSAY
Non-verbal Assertive Conduct
The hearsay rule strikes at out-of-court assertions not under oath or
subject to cross-examination offered in court to prove the truth of the out-
93. Id. 45:1453 (Supp. 1964).
94. Id. 44:1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
95. Id. 44:3(A)(1) (Supp. 1972).
96. Id. 44:3(C) (Supp. 1972).
97. 345 So. 2d 498 (La. 1977).
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of-court assertion. 98 Whether the out-of-court conduct was verbal or non-
verbal should make no difference.99 The 1973 case of State v. St.
Amandl° had taken a contrary position and very properly was disap-
proved in State v. Ford."'' Thus, if a person out of court points out
another person in a lineup with the intent of asserting that that person is the
perpetrator of a crime, or with similar intent picks out a photograph,
testimony describing such conduct is to be treated just as though the out-
of-court identification had been verbal rather than non-verbal. The court
held in Ford, however, that under the circumstances there presented the
admission of the testimony regarding the out-of-court identification was at
most non-reversible error. 02 The victim had positively identified the
defendant in testimony given at the preliminary examination. The victim
had thereafter died (of unrelated causes) and his preliminary examination
testimony was admitted in evidence at the trial. The supreme court held
that the out-of-court identifications by the victim were merely cumulative
and corroborative. Inter alia, via extensive discussion of developments
elsewhere in the country in this area, the court seemed to indicate its own
receptivity to the admissibility of such evidence under appropriate circum-
stances.
As recognized by the court in a footnote in Ford, according to
Louisiana law if the testimony of an identifying witness on the stand has
been assailed, testimony concerning prior out-of-court identifications by
him at an unsuspicious time are clearly admissible corroborative evidence
to support the in-court identification. For such evidence to come in under
98. See FED. R. EVID. 801; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 244 et seq. (1972); 5J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1360 et seq. (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); Comment,
Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L.
REV. 611 (1954), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 412.
99. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-
Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 455 (1974), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at
202 (Supp. 1976), and authorities therein cited.
100. 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 455 (1974), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 202 (Supp. 1976), and authorities therein cited.
101. 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976). The court also disapproved of language in State
v. Wilkerson, 261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306,
315 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 429, indicating such conduct to
be non-hearsay. See also State v. Jacobs, 344 So. 2d 659 (La. 1976) (following
Ford).
102. To similar effect, see State v. Williams, 343 So. 2d 1026 (La. 1977); State v.
May, 339 So. 2d 764 (La. 1976).
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this rule,' however, the testimony of the identifying witness must have
been "assailed. '-104 In the opinion of these writers, requiring such an
attack upon the testimony of the identifying witness is perhaps not an
undue limitation upon the admissibility of the out-of-court assertive
conduct. 05 The problem is fraught with difficulty and it is not easy to lay
down a rule which will be satisfying in all cases.
Following Ford, in State v. Jacobs'0 6 the majority of the court held
that when the victim of a crime is a witness in court and fails to give a
positive identification of the defendant, testimony concerning an out-of-
court identification by him is not only inadmissible hearsay, but its
admission in evidence constitutes reversible error. The writers agree.° 7
State of Mind of Victim
State v. Weedon10 8 decided during the past year is a case of great
significance. It involves a factual context of intriguing dramatic character
similar to that of other landmark cases in this area-Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hillmon , ° Shepard v. United States, 10 People v. Alcalde, I ' and
State v. Raymond. " 2 Like those cases, Ford tackles the problem of when,
if at all, an out-of-court statement of an individual is admissible as tending
to show the actions of another." 3
The defendant in Weedon had been charged with murdering his wife
and putting her body in the trunk of his car. Over pertinent objection, the
trial court had permitted the state to introduce testimony by three witnesses
that the dead wife had told them that she intended to leave her husband.
The theory of the state was that the evidence was relevant to show motive.
The statements to two of the witnesses were found to be unduly remote. 114
103. LA. R.S. 15:496, 497 (1950).
104. See discussion in text at notes 75-84, supra.
105. But see FED. R. EViD. 801.
106. 344 So. 2d 659 (La. 1976).
107. In Jacobs the victim on the witness stand said only that the defendant
'looked very much like' the perpetrator." 344 So. 2d at 660.
108. 342 So. 2d 642 (La. 1977).
109. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
110. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
111. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944).
112. 258 La. 1,245 So. 2d 335 (1971).
113. The dissenting justices in Weedon found it unnecessary to discuss the
hearsay issue.
114. The statements supposedly were made to the witnesses some three and five
weeks prior to the time of the wife's death and prior to the time that the wife had
taken a trip to California with her husband and returned to Louisiana with him.
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The statement to the third witness was much closer in time-a statement
by the wife the day before her death that she planned secretly to leave her
husband the next morning. The statement was inadmissible to show that
she carried out her intention, reasons the court, since if the wife had
succeeded in carrying out her intent, defendant would not have known of
her departure. If the alleged intent had been carried out, the supposed
motive would have been absent. Further, said the court, the statement was
inadmissible to show the state of mind of the wife apart from the
husband's motive. In this connection the court found that
[s]ince the hearsay was far more probative of [the husband's] motive,
prohibited by our jurisprudence, than of the wife's state of mind
(assuming the latter, uncommunicated to her husband, to be relevant,
cf. 32 La.L.Rev. 355), its prejudicial effect far outweighed its proba-
tive value as to the wife's state of mind or intention."15
The Raymond case, which had appeared to give an overly broad range to
the state of mind exception,' 16 happily seems to be severely limited by the
Weedon decision.
Admissions-Silence of a Defendant in Custody After Arrest
Two cases117 decided during the past term concern the admissibility
of evidence of the silence of a defendant in custody after arrest."' If the
prosecution at trial inquires about such silence or comments thereon before
the jury, is defendant entitled to a mistrial? A divided court held in State v.
Smith"'9 that prosecutorial references to the defendant's silence after arrest
are not embraced within the language of Code of Criminal Procedure
article 770120 regarding the consequences of reference to nontestimony of
115. 342 So. 2d at 647. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
116. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-
Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344, 352 (1972), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at
425.
117. State v. Montoya, 340 So. 2d 557 (La. 1976); State v. Smith, 336 So. 2d 867
(La. 1976).
118. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-
Evidence, 26 LA. L. REv. 606, 618 (1966), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at
327; Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 115 (1963), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 323.
See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
119. 336 So. 2d 867 (La. 1976).
120. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770 provides: "Upon motion of a defendant, a
mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the
jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in
argument, refers directly or indirectly to: . . . (3) The failure of the defendant to
testify in his own defense."
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a defendant at trial, and therefore do not necessarily entitle a defendant to
a mistrial. Although this interpretation of article 770 appears technically
sound, it seems that practically any mention of the fact that the defendant
kept silent after arrest should necessitate granting a motion for mistrial
under Code of Criminal Procedure article 771.121 Under this view, even so
slight an incursion upon the rule as encountered in State v. Smith should
suffice for mistrial. Because of the peculiar circumstances presented in
Smith, however, the majority concluded that an admonition to disregard
afforded the defendant sufficient protection.
In State v. Montoya, 122 the trial court had failed to sustain defend-
ant's objection to a prosecutorial question relative to defendant's non-
explanation of his actions to the police after his arrest. No effort was made
by the trial court to minimize the damage, and the decision of the supreme
court reversing the conviction appears clearly correct.
Confessions-Necessity of Article 768 Notice for Statements Offered on
Rebuttal
In an excellent opinion in State v. Sneed,123 Justice Tate etched out
the reasons underlying the statutory requirement for pre-trial notice to the
defendant of the state's intention to introduce a confession or inculpatory
statement. In the later case of State v. Turner,124 the court held that the
notice requirement was applicable to an inculpatory statement offered by
the state on rebuttal. 25
121. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 771 provides:
In the following cases, upon the request of the defendant or the state, the court
shall promptly admonish the jury to disregard a remark or comment made
during the trial, or in argument within the hearing of the jury, when the remark
is irrelevant or immaterial and of such a nature that it might create prejudice
against the defendant, or the state, in the mind of the jury: (1) When the remark
or comment is made by the judge, the district attorney, or a court official, and
the remark is not within the scope of Article 770; or (2) When the remark or
comment is made by a witness or person other than the judge, district attorney,
or a court official, regardless of whether the remark or comment is within the
scope of Article 770. In such cases, on motion of the defendant, the court may
grant a mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the
defendant a fair trial.
122. 340 So. 2d 557 (La. 1976).
123. 316 So. 2d 372 (La. 1975).
124. 337 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976).
125. It found, however, that in the context of the case the statement in fact was
not proper rebuttal evidence.
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Confessions-Defense Evidence on the Issue of Voluntariness
Louisiana law provides that before a confession may be introduced in
evidence it must be affirmatively shown that it was freely and voluntarily
made. 26 Defendant has a right to have a hearing on this matter outside the
presence of the jury,127 and it has long been held that at the hearing
defendant is entitled to testify on the voluntariness issue without exposing
himself to cross-examination on the entire case. 128 Such a holding is a
limitation upon the general Louisiana rule that a witness who takes the
stand may be cross-examined as to all relevant matter, 129 and that a
defendant who takes the stand is governed by the rules applicable to the
ordinary witness and may be cross-examined as to the entire case. 130 If the
trial judge decides that the confession is admissible, the state nonetheless
is obligated again to introduce evidence on the voluntariness issue before
the jury so that the jury may weigh the confession in light of the evidence
regarding voluntariness.' 3'
Defendants, of course, generally want to controvert such state evi-
dence and often would prefer to do it contemporaneously with the in-
troduction of the state's predicate and prior to the jury's hearing the
confession, rather than to delay the introduction of their evidence of non-
voluntariness until the defendant's case in chief. Whether a defendant has
the right to make such a contemporaneous attack on the voluntariness of
the confession was adverted to by the court, but unanswered, in State v.
Whatley. 132 It was again considered in State v. Carson 13 and State v.
Lovett. 134 The matter, for the time being at least, has been left to the
discretion of the trial court, without any hard and fast rules. The supreme
court appears to feel, however, that the preferable approach is for the trial
court to permit such defense evidence to be adduced prior to the reception
of the confession itself.
126. LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950). The same rule applies to admissions involving
criminal intent. LA. R.S. 15:454 (1950).
127. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 794, comment b. See also Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964).
128. See State v. Thomas, 208 La. 548, 23 So. 2d 212 (1945); State v. Lanthier,
201 La. 844, 10 So. 2d 638 (1942).
129. LA. R.S. 15:280 (Supp. 1967).
130. Id. 15:462 (1950).
131. See Comment, Confessions in Louisiana Law, 14 LA. L. REV. 642 (1954),
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 38, at 279. See also LA. CODE CRIM. P. art.
703(B).
132. 320 So. 2d 123 (La. 1975).
133. 336 So. 2d 844 (La. 1976).
134. 345 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977).
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State v. Lovett also faced the far more significant question of whether
defendant, contemporaneously with the introduction of the state's evi-
dence on the voluntariness issue, should be afforded the right to testify
before the jury on the limited issue of voluntariness, without subjecting
himself to cross-examination on issues other than voluntariness and mat-
ters relative to credibility. The problem split the court. The majority,
speaking through Justice Tate, reasoned that the issue is essentially one of
trying to protect defendant's interest in presenting evidence (especially his
own testimony) for use by the jury in weighing the confession, as well as
his interest in preserving his privilege against self-incrimination. Instead
of resting its opinion on constitutional considerations, the court based its
decision on an interpretation of statutes it found consonant with "greater
procedural efficiency and fairness."' 35 It concluded that the defendant
should be permitted to give such limited testimony and overruled conflict-
ing cases prospectively. The dissenters argued vigorously that the rule
announced by the majority is in derogation of the Louisiana statutory
scheme and its traditional "broad rule" of cross-examination, and that
permitting defendant to limit his testimony at the judicial hearing on
admissibility is a sufficient safeguard.
Co-Defendant's Confession Implicating Defendant
Relying in part upon State v. Hopper,13 6 the majority of the court in
State v. McSpaddin 37 takes the position that the Bruton3 1 rule does not
necessitate a mistrial where a non-testifying co-defendant's confession
implicating both co-defendant and defendant is introduced in evidence and
such confession interlocks with a similar confession by defendant im-
plicating the co-defendant. Although there is considerable authority to
135. Id. at 1143.
136. 253 La. 439, 218 So. 2d 551 (1969), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REV. 321, 330
(1970), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 656. See also Comment, Harmless
Constitutional Error-A Louisiana Dilemma?, 33 LA. L. REV. 82 (1972), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 550.
137. 341 So. 2d 868 (La. 1977).
138. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), discussed in Comment,
Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651
(1970), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 388. See also The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REv. 38 1,
389 (1971), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 411; The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REV. 321, 330
(1970), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 656.
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support the view taken by the court, the writers share the concern ex-
pressed by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz."' Despite the time and
expense necessarily involved in separate trials in such cases, it seems to us
that it is a price that should be paid to protect a defendant's valued right of
confrontation.
Excited Utterance-Necessity for Declarant to Have Had First-Hand
Knowledge
For an excited utterance to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule, must there be evidence sufficient to support an inference that
the declarant himself actually witnessed the exciting event? Citing case
law in other jurisdictions"4 and persuasive commentary,' the court in
State v. Bean ,142 in a well-reasoned opinion authored by Chief Justice
Sanders, holds in the affirmative.1 43 There was indication, however, that
the first-hand knowledge requirement might perhaps be satisfied not only
by evidence independent of the statement, but by affirmations in the
proffered statement itself.
The Bean case is an interesting one. The state's witness had come
upon the victim of a homicide, noted the knife wound in the stomach, and
contemporaneously was told by the declarant (who was apparently holding
the victim in his arms) that the defendant had stabbed the victim. The
supreme court, finding that there was insufficient evidence "to support a
reasonable inference" that declarant had first-hand knowledge of that of
which he spoke and noting that the case against the defendant was
circumstantial in character, concluded that the admission of the testimony
by the trial court was reversible error.
139. 476 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
140. Carney v. Pennsylvania R.R., 428 Pa. 489, 240 A.2d 71 (1968); Montesi v.
State, 220 Tenn. 354, 417 S.W.2d 554 (1967).
141. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 297, at 705 (2d ed. 1972); 6 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1751, at 155 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, Excited Utterances and Present
Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV.
661, 673 (1969), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 494; 29 AM. JUR. 2D
EVIDENCE § 724 at 795 (1967).
142. 337 So. 2d 496 (La. 1976).
143. The test laid down in the instant case appears somewhat more rigorous than
that formulated by Professor McCormick from his study of the case law: In a
modified manner the requirement that a witness have had an opportunity to observe
that to which he testifies is applied. Direct proof of firsthand knowledge is not
necessary; if the circumstances appear consistent with opportunity by the declar-





When is a witness "unavailable" within the meaning of the unavaila-
bility requirement for the admissibility of reported testimony? Feeling
constrained to follow earlier jurisprudence 144 about which he continued to
express misgivings, Justice Calogero, writing for a unanimous court in
State v. Pearson, 45 held that a witness is to be deemed "unavailable" for
this purpose even though he is actually in court, when despite appropriate
efforts his testimony cannot be secured. The court notes that although the
witness was not in fact held in contempt for refusal to answer, contempt
proceedings would have been useless since the witness was already serv-
ing a 20-year sentence in a federal penitentiary.
Business Records in Criminal Cases-Right of Confrontation
To what extent are business records admissible against a defendant in
a criminal case under an exception to the hearsay rule? Despite inherent
problems concerning a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation,
previous decisions by the supreme court appeared to take a fairly broad
view of admissibility under such an exception. 46
In the landmark case of State v. Monroe141 this past term, authored
by Justice Dennis, the court takes a much narrower, more conservative
view. In a scholarly opinion reviewing case law in Louisiana and law
review commentary, the court concluded that at times the Louisiana court
had been insufficiently protective of the rights of a defendant in this area
and held that
[b]efore the exception may be invoked by the State against the
defendant, allowing introduction of a permanent record made in the
ordinary course of business from personal knowledge of the facts
recorded, or from information furnished by one having a business
duty to observe and report the facts, it must be shown that the person
144. State v. Ghoram, 328 So. 2d 91 (La. 1976); State v. Dotch, 298 So. 2d 742
(La. 1974).
145. 336 So. 2d 833 (La. 1976).
146. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 671 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 547 (1975), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 207 (Supp. 1976); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 318
(1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 489.
147. 345 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1977).
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who made the record is genuinely unavailable for testimony, that he
had no strong motive to misrepresent, and that in all probability the
evidence is trustworthy. 4
8
Further, speaking of the right of confrontation, the court stated:
[I]t is generally accepted that any qualification of the right must be
justified by necessity and attended by strong assurance that evidence
admitted thereunder will be reliable. 149
Because of the prosecution's failure in Monroe to show the genuine
unavailability of the assistant coroner who had examined the victim of the
alleged aggravated rape, the court held that it was improper for the trial
court, over objection, to permit the coroner to testify from reports pre-
pared in conjunction with such examination and to receive in evidence the
reports themselves. The writers fully agree and enthusiastically applaud
the very sound and salutary approach taken by the court. Under certain
circumstances it is quite appropriate for the prosecution to be able to
introduce trustworthy business records against the defendant in a criminal
case, but defendant's constitutional right of confrontation must be given
maximum feasible protection, and the rule laid down by the court strives
to do just that.
The court in Monroe made clear that to the extent State v. Graves 50
and State v. Corey' 51 contained conflicting expressions they were
"expressly rejected."' 52 The Corey case had been decided only a few
months before Monroe and in the opinion of these writers had taken much
too relaxed an approach to the admissibility of business records evidence
offered by the prosecution. In Corey the court had held that documents
purporting to be "telephone slips" indicating that defendant in a murder
case had made certain very pertinent telephone calls were admissible in
evidence as business records, 53 despite the failure of the state to adduce
testimony by the persons making the slips or the custodians of the records.
Nor was there any showing that the persons making the slips were
unavailable, or that the records were trustworthy. Instead, as a foundation
148. Id. at 1190.
149. Id. at 1189.
150. 259 La. 526, 250 So. 2d 727 (1971).
151. 339 So. 2d 804 (La. 1976).
152. 345 So. 2d at 1190.
153. For statutory authority for a business records exception in Louisiana crimi-
nal cases, the court cited LA. R.S. 15:460 (1950). With deference, however, it is
submitted that section 460 concerns the means of proving a document that is
otherwise admissible, and does not provide that any document is admissible if
proved in the manner specified.
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the prosecution had adduced evidence from a police officer that he had
obtained the telephone slips from designated motels. In a very persuasive
dissent (a forerunner to the court's decision in Monroe) Justice Dixon
argued that the foundation laid for the admissibility of the records was
improper. In light of the position taken by the court in Monroe, the
majority opinion in Corey seems to have lost its persuasive authority.
PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Public Records-Cross-examination of Custodian
Properly certified copies of certain public records are to be admissible
in evidence to the same extent as the original without the necessity of their
custodian's testifying as to their authenticity. 154 Although the court recog-
nized in State v. Wientjes5 5 that the statute had not previously been
applied in criminal cases, it holds that the statute may be appropriate under
some circumstances in such cases. Referring to a provision in the hospital
records act156 authorizing an opposing party to call the maker of the record
under cross-examination,"5 7 the court indicates that the same privilege is
available with respect to the custodian of certified copies of public records
offered by an opponent. This statement in Wientjes, salutary though it is,
contrasts somewhat with earlier statements in another context that there is
no authority in criminal cases for a defendant to call a witness under cross-
examination. 58
Contemporaneous Objection Rule-Applicability Where Testimony on
Preliminary Examination Offered at Trial
In State v. Ford59 the court, speaking through Justice Tate, took the
position that since evidence offered at the preliminary examination may be
relevant and admissible at such examination for a purpose different from
that for which it might thereafter be offered at trial, failure to object to
testimony at the preliminary examination does not preclude appropriate
154. LA. R.S. 13:3711-3712 (1950).
155. 341 So. 2d 390 (La. 1976).
156. LA. R.S. 13:3714 (Supp. 1967).
157. See State v. O'Brien, 255 La. 704, 232 So. 2d 484 (1970), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA.
L. REV. 388 (1971), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 409.
158. See State v. Clark, 325 So. 2d 802 (La. 1976), and State v. Rogers, 324 So.
2d 403 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REv. 575, 582 (1977).
159. 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976).
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objection at trial. This position, we feel, is completely sound. If it were
otherwise, preliminary examinations would be much more cumbersome
and objection-ridden than they now are.
EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING APPEAL
Right to Transcript, the Contemporaneous Objection Rule, and Necessity
of Stating the Grounds for the Objection
Article I, section 19 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 states that
"[n]o person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or
property without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record
of all evidence upon which the judgment is based." The importance of the
right to a complete transcript was underlined in State v. Ford.'6 A divided
court there held that defendant was entitled to a new trial when, following
his trial, new counsel had been appointed for him to handle his appeal and
because of the absence of the court reporter at the trial a complete record
thereof was not available for use by defense counsel on appeal.
State v. Fields161 in dictum makes clear that article I, section 19 is to
be interpreted literally: that for there to be a waiver of the right of appeal,
defendant, not defense counsel, must have made the waiver. This does not
mean, however, says the court, that a defense counsel is without power to
waive other rights of his client. Other cases demonstrate that despite the
recent legislative abandonment 162 of the old technical bill of exceptions
procedure, careful defense counsel should be especially zealous to make
known to the court the grounds for an objection, 163 and should take care to
avoid any unintended suggestion that defense counsel acquiesces in an
unfavorable ruling of the court. 16 Code of Criminal Procedure articles 841
et seq. were clearly designed to institute a simplified objection procedure
and these writers urge that the articles not be given an unduly technical
160. 338 So. 2d 107 (La. 1976).
161. 342 So. 2d 624 (La. 1977).
162. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841-845, as amended by 1974 La. Acts, No. 297, §
1.
163. See State v. Nicolaus, 340 So. 2d 296 (La. 1976).
164. Compare State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370 (La. 1976) (which, in the opinion
of these writers, takes an unduly strict view) with State v. Montoya, 340 So. 2d 557
(La. 1976) (wherein the court (appropriately, it is believed) protected defense rights
on appeal despite the fact that in the heat of the trial and in deference to the trial




interpretation. Further, it is submitted that Louisiana should adopt a plain
error rule similar to that in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 165
COMPULSORY PROCESS
Violation of Sequestration Order
Where a witness has violated a sequestration order, what is the proper
remedy? Should the witness be held in contempt? Should the party calling
him be denied the opportunity to utilize his testimony? 166 If the witness in
question is one called by the defendant, problems regarding a defendant's
right of compulsory process are encountered. 167 The present position of
the Louisiana Supreme Court is that the matter is one addressing itself to
the sound discretion of the trial judge, 168 and despite vigorous protests by
dissenting justices, the trial court's rulings have generally been upheld. 169
A leading case is the 1973 decision in State v. Barnard.170 In
Barnard, a defense witness had inadvertently violated a sequestration
order and in consequence, the trial court precluded her from testifying. A
divided Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Thereafter,
considering the matter on habeas corpus, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took the position in Barnard v. Henderson'7'
that the trial court action had been erroneous, that because of this issue (in
165. FED. R. EVID. 103(d). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 611 (1977); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 65 1,
677 (1976).
166. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1842 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976).
167. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); 14 A.L.R.2d 16 (1967).
168. See State v. Holmes, 305 So.2d 409 (La. 1974); State v. Barnard, 287 So. 2d
770 (La. 1973); State v. Coleman, 254 La. 264, 223 So. 2d 402 (1969).
169. For recent cases upholding trial court denial of defendant's efforts to
secure the testimony of non-sequestered witness, see State v. Calloway, 343 So. 2d
694 (La. 1977); State v. McDaniel, 340 So. 2d 242 (La. 1976); State v. Baker, 338 So.
2d 1372 (La. 1976); State v. Bias, 337 So. 2d 426 (La. 1976).
For recent cases upholding the trial court's permitting a non-sequestered
state's witness to testify, see State v. Mitchell, 344 So. 2d 1026 (La. 1977); State v.
Johnson, 343 So. 2d 155 (La. 1977); State v. McCray, 337 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1976).
Criticizing the "discretionary" rule, Justice Barham in dissent in State v. Barnard,
after reviewing the cases, stated "it would seem that the discretionary rule is
invoked to allow the State's witnesses to testify, while prohibiting the defendant's
from exercising the same privilege." 287 So. 2d at 779.
170. 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 531 (1975), reprinted
in G. PUGH, supra note 39, at 174 (Supp. 1976).
171. 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tandem with another) defendant was entitled either to be released or to be
retried. The later Barnard case relied upon Braswell v. Wainwright,172
another habeas corpus case, which had laid down the rule that absent the
"knowledge, procurement, or consent" of defendant or his counsel, the
violation of a sequestration order is not to preclude the defendant from
adducing the testimony of a witness.173
Despite the seemingly fixed position of the federal courts in this
area,' 74 the Louisiana Supreme Court continues to cite State v. Barnard as
representing the proper view. 75 The recent case of State v. Baker 76 is
especially disturbing. The facts in Baker were very close to those in
Barnard. Despite persuasive dissenting opinions relying on Barnard v.
Henderson and the defendant's right of compulsory process, the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to permit defendant to call a
very significant witness. In addition to raising grave constitutional ques-
tions, such decisions as Baker seem out of harmony with the history and
spirit of the legislation in the area. The 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure
expressly provided that the issuance of a sequestration order "shall not
deprive either party of the right of calling or examining as a witness one
who shall not have obeyed the order of sequestration, when such party
shall show that the witness remained in court or otherwise disobeyed the
order without knowledge and without the connivance of the party calling
him.' ' 177 Applying this provision, a unanimous supreme court in State v.
Harris' held that a trial judge was without authority to deny a defense
172. 463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1972).
173. The Fifth Circuit in both Barnard and Braswell cited the approach taken by
the United States Supreme Court in Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91 (1893),
wherein the Court states: "If a witness disobeys the order of withdrawal, while he
may be proceeded against for contempt and his testimony is open to comment to the
jury by reason of his conduct, he is not thereby disqualified, and the weight of
authority is that he cannot be excluded on that ground merely, although the right to
exclude under particular circumstances may be supported as within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Id. at 92. To be contrasted with the Holder language is
the discussion in 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1842 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976).
174. See Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975); Braswell v.
Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1972); JONES ON EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL (6th ed. S. Gard ed. 1972); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE § 615(01) (1977).
175. See State v. McDaniel, 340 So. 2d 242, 246 (La. 1976); State v. Bias, 337 So.
2d 426, 430 (La. 1976).
176. 338 So. 2d 1372 (La. 1976).
177. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 371 (1928).
178. 179 La. 405, 154 So. 39 (1934).
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witness the opportunity to testify because of a violation of the trial judge's
sequestration order where it was shown that the non-compliance was
without the knowledge or connivance of defense counsel. Writing for the
court, Chief Justice O'Niell stated:
The purpose of this proviso, manifestly, is to prevent either party
from being deprived of the testimony of a witness, by disobedience
on the part of the witness, either through his ignorance or by induce-
ment on the part of some one other than the party calling the
witness. . . .The meaning of the discretion which is vested in the
judge is that he may, for any reason that he deems sufficient, exempt
any witness or class of witnesses from the effect of his order to leave
the courtroom, and that he may permit to testify any witness who has
violated the order, and that neither party shall have just cause to
complain that any such witness was permitted to testify. 179
The deletion of the provision from the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure
was seemingly to provide contempt of court as the only remedy for
violation of a sequestration order, not to make denial of testimony a matter
of trial court discretion, 18 regardless of the knowledge or connivance of
counsel. In this connection the comment to the 1966 sequestration article
states that "[u]nlike former R.S. 15:371, this article does not disqualify
the witness for disobedience of the provisions of the article. However,
after the court instructs the witness as provided by this article, a violation
is a contempt."1 8' The Louisiana Constitution stipulates that "[t]he power
179. Id. at 409-10, 154 So. at 40-41.
180. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-
Criminal Procedure, 31 LA. L. REV. 370, 376 (1971), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra
note 39, at 651.
181. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 764, comment (b). That this was in fact the intention
of the Louisiana State Law Institute is made perhaps even clearer by an earlier
version of the same comment, the one approved at the September 1965 meeting of
the Semantics Committee concerning the Code of Criminal Procedure:
Article 5 has been adopted unanimously by the council and reads as follows:
Article 5. Exclusion and conduct of witnesses
Before or at any stage of a trial, the court may, and at the request of either
the state or the defendant shall, order that the witnesses shall not be allowed
to remain at any place where they may see or hear the proceedings. The court
shall order the witnesses not to discuss with each other or any person the facts
of the case or the testimony of any witness. The order shall not apply to
communications between witnesses and the district attorney or defense
counsel. The court may modify its order as justice may require.
Source: New; cf. R.S. 15:371.
Comments
(a) The proposed text is a stylistic revision of R.S. 15:371 except that it
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to punish for contempt of court shall be limited by law,"' 82 and nowhere
in the criminal procedure area is such denial of testimony explicitly
authorized. 8 3
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
Opening Statement by District Attorney
In recent years the law has become much more realistic, relying much
less upon the efficacy of judicial instructions to disregard or limit the use
of certain evidence or other information. 8 4 State v. Green, 8 5 it seems to
these writers, runs counter to these currents of realism and is a very
disturbing case. The state's contention in a negligent homicide case was
that the victim's death in an automobile accident had been caused by
defendant's driving while intoxicated. The district attorney's opening
statement outlined in dramatic detail the devastating results of the defend-
ant's blood test. 86 Because of what the trial court found to be non-
compliance with the pertinent statute, however, the results of the blood
omits that part of the latter which seems to require that the witnesses are
placed in custody of the sheriff, when an order of sequestration is issued. This
seems unnecessary.
(b) The proposed text rejects the concept of-disqualification of the wit-
ness for disobedience of the provisions of the article as does R.S. 15:371.
However, the sanction of contempt proceedings is available, but the Advisors
thought that it was not necessary to state the fact specifically. Obviously after
the court has instructed the witness as provided by Art. 5, a violation would be
a contempt.
Without discussing the Official Comment, State v. Rouse, 256 La. 275, 236 So.
2d 211 (1970), held that exclusion of testimony is an available remedy.
182. LA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
183. Article 21(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "contuma-
cious failure to comply" shall constitute a direct contempt of court, and article 25 of
the Code provides "except as otherwise provided in this article, a court may punish
a person adjudged guilty of contempt of court in connection with a criminal
proceeding by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for
not more than six months, or both."
184. See Bruton v. United States, 393 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); State v. Rideau, 242 La.
431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1961-1962 Term-Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV. 413 (1963), reprinted in G.
PUGH, supra note 39, at 657.
185. 343 So. 2d 149 (La. 1977).
186. The district attorney stated that the analysis of defendant's blood
I showed that this man had a blood alcohol content by weight of .30. Under the
law of Louisiana a person with a blood alcohol content of .10 is presumed to be
intoxicated. This man is three times past that presumption.' " 343 So. 2d at 151.
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test were held inadmissible in evidence. The trial court denied defendant's
motion for a mistrial but carefully instructed the jury that in arriving at
their verdict they were to consider only the testimony of sworn witnesses,
and that what the lawyers said and argued was not evidence. The supreme
court affirmed, a majority concluding that clear and substantial prejudice
had not been shown. Three justices dissented. No justice argued that the
remarks had been made in bad faith by the prosecution. In the only dissent
with written reasons, Justice Tate argued eloquently, however, that de-
fendant was entitled to a new trial. He reasoned that Code of Criminal
Procedure article 766 requires only that the district attorney shall explain
"in general terms, the nature of the evidence by which the state expects to
prove the charge" and that "[w]hen the prosecutor details evidence which
subsequently is not admitted, he takes the risk that a mistrial may have to
be granted." 1 87
In the opinion of these writers, it is wholly unrealistic to believe that
the jury in the Green case would actually have been able to follow the trial
court's limiting instructions. The statement by the prosecutor was in
positive language, asserting facts central to the case. The "reverberating
clang" of the prosecution's statement that the test showed that the defend-
ant was "three times past" the statutory presumption of intoxication
would, it is submitted, have drowned out judicial instructions to limit or
ignore. 88 Once such an accusatory note was struck, the bell could not
thereafter be unrung.
EVIDENTIARY RULES APPLICABLE IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS
In an excellent opinion authored by Justice Dennis, the majority of
the court in State v. Jenkins 189 makes clear that the preliminary examina-
tion provided for by Code of Criminal Procedure articles 291 et seq. " "is
to be full blown and adversary, and one in which the defendant is entitled
to confront witnesses against him and to have full cross-examination of
them.' 9' However, it appears from Jenkins that under very limited
circumstances certain hearsay testimony that would not be admissible at
the trial may be properly admissible at the preliminary examination. 192
187. Id. at 154.
188. See the statement by Justice Cardozo in an analogous context in Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
189. 338 So. 2d 276 (La. 1976).
190. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 291-298.
191. 338 So. 2d at 279. In support of the right of full cross-examination, see also
the per curiam opinion in State v. Antoine, 344 So. 2d 666 (La. 1977).
192. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
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EVIDENTIARY RULES APPLICABLE IN DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
As amended in 1971, the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana
State Bar Association provide that in disbarment proceedings following an
attorney's conviction of what is determined to be a "serious crime," the
certificate of conviction shall constitute "conclusive evidence of his guilt
of the crime for which he has been convicted" 93 and that the sole issue at
the disciplinary hearing shall be "whether the crime warrants discipline,
and if so, the extent thereof."" Further, "[a]t the hearing the respondent
may offer evidence only of mitigating circumstances not inconsistent with
the essential elements of the crime for which he was convicted as deter-
mined by the statute defining the crime."' 195 To what extent may the
defendant at the disciplinary hearing go into the circumstances of the
crime in order to show the extent of his involvement-for example, that
albeit guilty of a criminal conspiracy, he played only a minor role therein?
The matter was the subject of consideration by the court during the past
term. 196 In State v. Loridans 97 the court held that defendant could not
introduce evidence for the purpose of showing that he lacked the know-
ledge or intent required by the criminal statute, but that this did not
preclude "an inquiry into the facts surrounding the commission of the
offense insofar as they reflect upon the character or quality of the criminal
conduct or a respondent's degree of complicity therein."' 98 It is not
always easy to ascertain whether particular evidence offered by the de-
fendant is admissible as bearing on the degree of his complicity in the
crime, or is inadmissible because it is "inconsistent with the essential
Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 600 (1977); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 535,
551 (1977); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Louisiana Constitutional Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 544 (1976); Note, 36 LA. L.
REV. 1050 (1976).
Compare in this connection the language in the later per curiam opinion of the
court in State v. Antoine, 344 So. 2d 666 (La. 1977), which may indicate a broader
approach to the admissibility of hearsay evidence at the preliminary examination.
193. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N, LA. R.S. 37,
ch. 4, art. XV, § 8, 7(c).
194. Id. art. XV, § 8, 7(d).
195. Id.
196. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Hamilton, 343 So. 2d 985 (La. 1977); Louisia-
na State Bar Ass'n v. Ponder, 340 So. 2d 134 (La. 1976); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Shaheen, 338 So. 2d 1347 (La. 1976); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Loridans, 338
So. 2d 1338 (La. 1976).
197. 338 So. 2d 1338 (La. 1976).
198. Id. at 1345.
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elements of the crime."' It seems to these writers that the proper test of
admissibility is similar to that used in a sentence determination in an
ordinary criminal case. 2°
199. See dissents by Justice Dennis in Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Shaheen,
338 So. 2d 1347, 1354 (La. 1976); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Loridans, 338 So. 2d
1338, 1347 (La. 1976).
200. See sentence guidelines embodied in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
article 894.1 enacted by Act 635 of 1977 providing, inter alia, that the court shall
accord weight to whether there were "substantial grounds tending to excuse or
justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense." LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1(4).
